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ALUMNI NOTES.
G. W. Huntley, '93, of Kalispell, Montana, is visiting his parents, Hon. and Mrs.
G. W. Huntley, at Emporium, Cameron
county. Mr. Huntley has builtup a large
and lucrative lumber business.
Blake E. Irvin, '98, Burgess of Brookville, Pa., and recently elected Secretary
of the BarAssociation of Jefferson county,
visited Carlisle during the week of Jan.
18th.

J. Kirk Bosler, '99, was married on Nov.
18, 1903, to Miss Mary P. Mullin, a daughter of Col. Chas. H. Mullin, of Mt. Holly.
They will reside in Carlisle, wbere Mr.
Bosler is engaged in the practice of law.
Roger Dever, 103, of Freeland, Pa., was
admitted to the Luzerne County Bar on
Jan. 11, 1904.
John Watson, '03, is Principal of a school
at Bloomsburg, Pa.
Adams B. Vera, '03, is Assistant.Superintendent of the N. Y. Division of the International Correspondence Institute, of
Washington, D. C., with offices in the
Flat-iron Building, New York City.

CARLISLE,

PA.

Alvin Sherbine, '03, visited Carlisle Jan.
5th, 6th and 7th.
Geo. W. Cisney, '03, is practicing law at
Pittsburg.
E. L. flively, '03, of Altoona, spent Jan.
16th and 17th with friends in Carlisle.
Thomas Lidy, '98, has been nominated
by the Democrats of Berks county for District Attorney.
Oliver Lentz, '00, recently appeared before the Board of Pardons in behalf of Mrs.
Edwards, who stands convicted of murder
in the first degree.
William A. Shomo, '03, took his Supreme
Court examination in Philadelphia in December.
Charles Shalters, '98, has been chosen
County Solicitor for Berks county.
CAMPUS NOTES.
The College Fair and Festival, held in
the gymnasium on the evenings of Jan.
14th, 15th and 16th, for the benefit of the
College Athletic Association, was a marked
success.
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The following men are practicing for the
Law School Basketball team: Prickitt,
Amerman, James, Carlin, Smith, Setzer
and Davies. A series of games is being
arranged.
The second of a series of six informal
dances was held by the Comus Club, in
Armory Hall, Saturday evening, Jan. 23d
The dance was highly successful.
Prof. G. Wilson Swartz transacted legal
business in New York City on Jan. 19th
and 20th.
CLASS NOTES.
Willis, '04, has.recovered from an attack
of tonsilitis.
Flynn, 704, spent Jan. 10th, l1th and
12th in Philadelphia, being called there on
business.
The FORUm takes pleasure in announcing an improvement in the condition of
Parks, '05. He is as yet too feeble to return to school.
J. M. Lininger, a practicing attorney of
Mercer county, is taking a special course
in the Law School.
Heller, '05, spent Monday afternoon,
Jan. 18th, in Harrisburg.
Kugler, '06, of Limerick, did not return
to school this term.
Rabbi Samuel Friedman, ex-'05, is pursuing his legal studies in the offices of Hargest & Hargest, in Harrisburg.
Many of the Seniors have begun work on
their theses. The legal literature will receive a contribution.
Prof. Hutton's classes in Bankruptcy
and Partnership have completed those
courses, and will now take up the law of
Insurance and Landlord and Tenant.

MOOT COURT.
COMMONWEALTH vs. WILLIAM
RUPPERT.
Evidence-Rightof defendant to meet "the
witness face to face' '-Interpreters.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

In a trial for robbery a witness who

spoke Polish was allowed to testify in his
own language, an interpreter translating
it to the jury. Ruppert excepted on the
ground that the testimony of the interpreter was hearsay, and that the constitutional privilege ofbeingconfronted with
the witness was denied him.
M. KAUFFMAN for defendant.
Art. 1, sec. 9, Const. of Pa.:-"In all
criminal prosecutions the accused hath a
right to be heard by himself and his counsel, to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to meet the
witness face to face."
SPENCER and JONES for Commonweal th.
1. Where a witness cannot speak the
English language, or speaks it very imperfectly, his testimony may properly be
given through a sworn interpreter. State
v. Severson, 78 Iowa 653; Norberg's case,
4 Mass. 81; People v. Young, 108 Cal. 8;
State v. Hamilton, 42 L. R. A. 1204;
Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Shunk, 131 Ill.
283: Com. v. Jonegras, 181 Pa. 172; Coin.
v. Hess, 18 Pa. C. C. 542.
2. Statements of interpreter are treated
as identical with those of the witness, and
therefore the constitutional privilege is
not denied. I Greenleaf on EVidence 183;
Turner v. Yates. 16 How. 14; Allen v.
Killinger, 8 Wall. 480; Chapman v-.
Twitchell, 37 Me. 59; Chadsey v. Greene,
24 Conn. 562.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The questions to be decided in this case,
are, (1st) whether the testimony of a witness through an interpreter is hearsay.
(2nd.) Whether, allowing the witness to
have an interpreter, is denying the defendant the constitutional right of being
confronted by the witness.
A court interpreter is defined as one,
who on a trial, translates for the benefit of
the court and jury, the language of a witness speaking a foreign tongue, or a dumb
(Black's Law
witness making signs.
Dict.)
Mr. Benthan has observed that to constitute hearsay testimony it must be separated by the interposition of some appreciable time from its reception from the
party from whom it is obtained. A, a
witness in court, for instance, speaks in so
low a tone that what he says has to be repeated to the jury, or a foreigner, when
examined, has to be interpreted by an interpreter. In this case the transmission
of the witness' evidence is instantaneous,
though through the medium of another
person, and it is sometimes argued that
because such evidence is instantaneous, it
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is not hearsay. But a sounder reason for
the distinction is that in cases of repetition
or interpretation, the inaudible or foreign
witness is examined ir court, and is
therefore responsible, while the interpreter is also sworn, and the person who repeats may be corrected by others who
heard as well as himself. Hence, the
sworn translation of the interpreter is not
hearsay. Wharton on Evi. 174; Greenleaf on Evi. p. 274.
In Com. v. Hess, 18 Pa. County Ct. 542,
the court said, inter alia, "In regard to
the interpreter, we recognize the necessity
to employ one in the proper case, otherwise there would be a denial of justice,
throdgh inabilities of a witness to be understood.
In order to get before the court ordi
evidence bearing upon matters under inquiry, that justice may be done between
the parties, it frequently becomes necessary to appoint an interpreter, and where
the necessity exists the court not only has
the right to make such an appointment,
but it is its duty to do so. Com. v. Jonegrass, 181 Pa. 172; Wright v. Maseras,
56 Barb. (N. Y.) 521; Houft v. Houft,
Wright (Ohio) 156; Amory v. Fellowes, 5
Mass. 219; Norberg's Case, 4 Mass. 81;
People v. Ah Wee, 48 Cal. 236.
The question ofadmissibility of evidence
through an interpreter is discussed at some
length in a note given in 17 L. R. A. 813.
The statements of an interpreter of what
a party says are treated as identical with
those of the party himself. Turner v.
Yates, 36 How. 14; Allen v. Killinger, 8
Wall. 480; Chadsey v. Greene, 24 Conn.
562.
The above certainly establishes the fact
that the interpreter's repeating the witness's testimony in another language,
does not make it hearsay.
The act of the 18th of February, 1869,
authorizes the Governor of this Commonwealth to appoint an interpreter in the
counties of Philadelphia and Allegheny,
who shall interpret the testimony of any
witness who testifies in a foreign language, etc.
Since such an act has been passed by
the Legislature, and has stood since 1869,
it can contain nothing which is contrary
to the constitution.
Being confronted by the witness means

simply that the witness shall be in court
at the time of testifying and in the presenceofthetribunal and opponent. Greenleaf on Evi., p. 281.
The court is of opinion, therefore, that
Ruppert has not been denied the constitutional right of being confronted by the
witness, and judgment is hereby entered
for the Commonwealth.
LEO McDONALD J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Per Ouriam. Judgment affirmed.
JOHN ADAMS vs. GEORGE WASHINGTON.
.4jetment-

raudulent conveyances-

.Rightsofpurchaser,innocent as to part
of purchasemoney,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Kale conveyed his farm to Roberts,
and a year later, Roberts conveyed it to
On a judgment against
Washington.
Kale, received after the conveyance to
Roberts but upon a debt contracted before,
the land was sold to Adams.
In the ejectment Adams offered to
show that Kale had declared after his
conveyance that he made it to evade the
paymentof his debts and also that Roberts
had stated that he bought the land in
order to assist Kale to evade this payment.
There was no evidence that Washington
knew of this until he had contracted to
buy and had paid one-fourth the purchase
money but then learned of the evidence
showing the fraud of Kale's conveyance
MOREHOUSE and LANARD for plaintiff.
One purchasing with the knowledge of
fraud is not bona fide, and cannot defeat
creditors of third party. Dean v. Connelly, 6 Pa. 250. Fraud may be established by facts sufficient to warrant a
presumption of its existence, (Jones v.
Lewis, 148 Pa. 234,) and evidence on same
should be liberally construed. Garrigies
v. Harris, 17 Pa. 350. The slightest evidence of a fraudulent combination opens
the door to declarations of grantor, Rogers
v. Hall, 4 W. 359; Bredin v. Lame, 3 Ban.
81; Gibbs v. Ucaly, 7 W. 406. Thompson
v. Daugherty, 12 S. & R. 448. A purchaser will be protected in equity to extent of payments made before notice,
not for those made after notice. Heyserv.
Aughe, 40N . J. Eq. 481.
SMITH and LOuRImER for defendant.
Declarations of grantor are not evidence
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of fraud as against an honest purchaser,
(MeElfatrich v. Hicks, 21 Pa. 406), and are
not evidence to effect title in the hands of
such purchaser from grantee. 3 W. & S.
127; 91 Pa. 462; 9 S. & R. 47. A bona fide
purchaser, without notice of fraud, from a
party to whom proparty is transferred in
fraud of creditors of original transferrer,
takes a good title whether fraud be actual
or legal. Shaw v. Levy, 17 S. & R. 99;
Thompson v. McKean, 1 Ash. (Pa.) 129;
3 P. & W. 160; 8 W.489; Thompson v. Lee,
3 W. & S. 479. Bona fide purchasers are
protected by the statute of 13 Eliz. Boyer
v. Weiner, 204 Pa. 295.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an action of ejectment brought
by a purchaser at a sheriff's sale against
one who has purchased from the fraudulent grantee of the judgment debtor.
The Statute of 13 Eliz. pronounces as
void all conveyances which are made with
intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors. It appears from the statement of
facts that between Kale, the original
grantor, and Roberts his grantee, there
was an intention shared by both parties to
so hinder, delay or defraud Kale's creditors. Consequently as between them and
such creditors the conveyance is fraudulent and void.
About the time of the fist conveyance
both thegrantor and grantee made certain
declarations which are offered for the purpose of affecting the whole title of the defendant. "The general rule that the declarations of a grantor made after the execution of a grant cannot be used to impeach it, has been so far modified, that
when the good faith of the transfer has
been attacked by creditors and some evidence has been advanced to show a common purpose or design by the parties to
hinder, delay or defraud them, subsequent
declarations by a grantor are admissible."
Hartman v. Diller, 62 Pa. 387; Boyer v.
Weiner, 204 Pa. 295. "The vital question
is whether the defendant had notice of
the fraud when he entered into the contract. Until there was some testimony
tending to show such knowledge on his
part, the testimony objected to was properly inadmissible." Therefore, there is
nothingto Impeach his good faith as to the
part of the purchase money he had paid,
before he acknowledged discovery of the
fraud.
The defendant must be treated as a bona
fide purchaser for value as to the one-

fourth part of the purchase money, but
he cannot ask to be indemnified as to the
money paid after the discovery of the
fraud.
Where one purchases the legal title
without any notice of equities and after
paying part of the consideration discovers
the equities, before the cestui que trust
shall affect the purchaser's title, it will be
necessary to indemnify him for all payments made by him up to the time when
he first received notice. Notice to the
purchaser before payment of all the money
is sufficient to affect him. Union Canal
Co. v. Young, 1 Wharton 429; Jwenal v.
Jackson, 14 Pa. 524. Griffith v. Sears, 112
Pa. 580.
It follows from the above that one who
has purchased property sold for the purpose of defrauding creditors without notice of the fraudulent purpose, will be protected in his purchase as against the
claims of the seller's creditors only to the
extent to which he has actually paid the
purchase money before receiving notice
of fraudulent intent.
This deed was therefore partly fraudulent as to creditors, and the only way by
which they could avoid it would be by indemnifying the purchaser, for the purchaser at the sheriff's sale on the judgment obtained against the grantor after
fraudulent conveyance obtains the right
which the defrauded creditors had to
avoid the conveyance. The plaintiff in
this case would be entitled to the land
upon the payment to the defendant of the
amount which he paid before he had
notice of the fraud.
The case of Girard Nat. Bank, 13 W. N.
C. 101, decided that ejectment would be
the proper remedy and not a bill in equity.
Upon payment therefore, by the plaintiff, of ( ) one-fourth of the purchase
money to defendant, a decree will be
rendered in his favor.
Conditional judgment for plaintiff.
A. H. JAMES, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The emphatic language of the statute,
13 Elizabeth, ch. 5, declaring conveyances, made with the intent to defraud
the grantor's creditors, null and void,
would, if literally applied to the facts beforeus,promptly disposeof the claims of the
defendant. If the conveyance to Roberts
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was void, he, of course, could convey nothing to Washington. However, it has always been decided that, as between the
parties, the transfer is valid and unimpeachable by either party. Even as against
creditors, it is merely voidable, i. e. binding until avoided. It is well settled law,
therefore, that a bona fide purchaser, who
has paid value for a conveyance from the
fraudulent grantee, will acquire a title safe
from the attack of the grantor's creditors.
Thompson v. McKean, 1 Asbur. 129; Hood
v. Fahnestock, 8 Watts 489; Heath v.
Page, 63 Pa. 108.
It is to be noted that the judgment on
which the land was sold to the plaintiff
was not recovered until after the fraudulent
conveyance. It, therefore, did not become
a lien upon the land. Heath v. Page,
supra,Byrod's Appeal, 31 Pa. 241. Had
it been recovered before the sale, neither of
the later conveyances would have had the
least effect upon it. But in a case like
this, the purchaser at a sheriff's sale buys
merely a right to prove the conveyance of
the judgment debtor fraudulent. Inasmuch as the debt upon which the judgment was gotten was one in existence
when the first transfer was made, there
can be no question as to the right of such
a creditor to impeach the debtor's conveyance. The plaintiff has acquired the right
of this creditor.
As has been said, in order that the plaintiff may recover in this action, not only
must the conveyance to Roberts have been
fraudulent but Washington also must have
bought with notice of this fraud or else
have been wanting in the payment of a
valuable consideration. Now it is fundamental, that he who alleges fraud must
prove it. The burden is clearly then on
Adams to show the fraudulent intent of
Kale and to prove notice of this to Roberts.
Is the burden upon him also to prove
notice to Washington?
It has been repeatedly decided that one
who claims as a purchaser from a vendee,
whose title is shown to be voidable because
of fraud practiced by him upon his vendor,
is under the burden of proving both that
he bought without notice of the fraud and
that he paid value. Tainter v. Hyneman,
6 Phila. 202; Neff v. Landis, 110 Pa. 208;
Bughman v. Central Bank, 159 Pa. 98;
Stevens v. Brennan, 79 N. Y. 254, (ap-

proved in Levy v. Cooke, 143 Pa. 614).
This rule is applied to negotiable notes.
The plaintiff, in a suit by an indorsee is
bound to prove his innocence and payment of value if the maker first proves the
fraud of the payee. A fortioriis the rule
adhered to in cases of sales of chattels or
of land. Easter, et. al., v. Allen, 8 Allen 7;
Somes v. Brewer, 2 Pick. 184.
In the present case, however, Roberts'
title was voidable not because of fraud upon
his vendor but because of the intent to defraud creditors.
Should this difference
change the rule? The question is one upon
which the courts are divided. Thornton
v. Hook, 36 Col. 223, and Sanders v. Lee,
et. al., 101 N. 0. 3, declare that the burden
is upon the creditor to prove notice to the
purchaser. Rush v. Mitchell, 71 Iowa 333;
Schaible v. Ardner, 98 Mich. 70; declare
that the burden is on the purchaser to
show his good faith. Until the present
year it does not seem that the exact question has been passed upon in Pennsylvania. In Boyer v. Weimer, 204 Pa. 295,
however, it is emphatically declared, not
only that the burden is upon the creditor
to prove the knowledge of the purchaser,
but that this must be his initial step.
Until proof of this fact has been given all
evidence of the voidable character of the
title of the defendant's grantor is inadmissible.
The reason for placing the burden on
the purchaser, viz., that the fact to be
proved is one necessarily within his knowledge, applies as fully where the title is
voidable by creditors as where it is voidable by the vendor and the reason for distinguishing the cases is not apparent.
However, though no reasons are given
nor authorities cited, we must take Boyer
v. Weimer as determining the law in
Pennsylvania,
The learned court below was clearly
right in holding that, while the declarations of a grantor are generally inadmissible for the purpose of impeaching his
grant, when, as here, they are made after
the transaction, yet, where some prior evidence has been given tending to show a
common purpose or design between the
grantor and his grantee to defraud the
former's creditors, such evidence may be
given. Souder v. Schlechterly, 91 Pa. 83;
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 91 Pa. 462;
Widdall v. Garnd, 125 Pa. 358.
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If then the plaintiff first gave evidence
of the declarations of Roberts, he supplied
the necessary prior evidence of common
design, and the declaration of Kale then
became a legitimate object of proof. It
may be objected that Roberts was a grantor
himself and that evidence of his declaration should be rejected until there has
been some evidence of collusion on the
part of his grantee. But Roberts' declaration did not impeach his conveyance to
Washington. The latter's title is rather a
new creation springing from his bona fide
purchase.
This objection is, therefure,
groundless. But, as shown above, evidenceof notice to Washington is that first
demanded, not so much to render admissible his grantor's declarations, as because
it is vital to a recovery.
But let us suppose that the evidence has
been presented in its proper order, and
that it is all believed by the jury, would
this entitle the plaintiff to recover in this
ejectment? Clearly the defendant has no
equity as to any of the purchase money he
may have paid after notice. March v.
Armstrong, 20 Minn. 81; Rhodes v. Green,
36 Ind. 7. The plaintiff is entitled to
receive the amount yet unpaid
to
Roberts when Washington received notice.
Vance Shoe Company v. Hought, 41 W .
Va. 275; Toppan v. Harbeson, 43 Ark. 84.
Equity may give the the plaintiff a lien
on the premises for the unpaid ainount.
Dowell v. Applegate, 7 Fed. 881. Butis it
equitable to disturb defendant in his possession of the land? Suppose he has made
valuable improvements since going into
possession? In any event, must a bona
fide purchaser run the risk of losing his
bargain and of being turned out of possession because a fraction of the purchase
price remains unpaid? The learned court
below awards the defendant a return of
the one-fourth of the price already paid.
This might do full justice and it might
not. We are of the opinion that equity
would be-much surer of being done if the
plaintiff were awarded the part of the
purchase money unpaid when defendant
received notice.
We would therefore revise the judgment
ofthelearned court below by providingthat
the judgment for the plaintiff should be
void upon the payment by the defendant
of the remaining installments of purchase

money as they fall due under his contract
of purchase.
With this condition the judgment for
the plaintiff is affirmed.

W'M. FELL vs. ABRAM ABBOTT.
,S'e-off-,udgmnt-Jucdgment on contract
againstjudgment on tort.
STATEM1ENT OF THE CASE.

Abbott sued Fell for assault and battery
and obtained a judgment for $200 damages; later Fell obtained a judgment of
$900 for a debt of Abbott to him, existing
before the assault. Fell now petitions the
court, in which the judgments are, for a
rule to show cause why $200 of his judgment should not be setoff against Abbott's
judgment, so as to pay it.
CAREY for petitioner.

A judgment for a debt may be set off
against one obtained upon a tort. 13 Pa.
C. R. 593; Miller v. Krelter, 76 Pa. 78;
Poseck v. Veckroth, 3 Dist. R. 150; See P.
& L. Dig. Dec., col. 16706, sec. 2608-2609.
A judgment without waiver of exemption can beset off against one with waiver.
Riehl v. Veckroth, 1 Dist. R. 80.
HEDGES for respondent.
The power to set off one judgment
against another does not rest upon any
statute. Am. &Eng. Encyc. of Law, Vol.
22, 1). 446. The whole doctrine is founded
on equitable principles, and its exercise is
determined therefore by the justice and
propriety of it, under the factsand circumstances of each particular case. Windle v.
Moore, 10 W. N. C. 387, and cases cited.
This power will never be exercised where
the set-off would deprive a party of his
legal rights. Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law,
Vol. 22, p. 448.
A judgment founded on a contract will
not usually be set-off against one founded
upon tort, for upon one exemption may
be claimed, while upon the other it may
not. McCormick v. Alexander, 3 Pa. D.
R. 149; Bosehe v. Maurer & Rothermel, 5
Pa. C. C. R. 215; Cleveland v. McCann a,
41 L. R. A. 852.
Tile rights of the parties are not the same
or equal. Ramsey's Appeal, 2 W. 228;
Windle v. Moore, Bosche v. Maurer and
Rothermel & McCormick v. Alexander,
supra.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question to be decided in this case
is, whether a judgment for damages arising from a tort action van be set-off against
one arising from contract.
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The petitioner contends that this can
be done, for the reasons : 1st, that in both
cases the damages are liquidated, and 2nd,
that they are of equal grade. To support
this he cites 13 Pa. County Court Rep.
593; Poseck v. Veckroth, 3 D. Rep. 150;
Riehl v. Veckroth, 1 D. Rep. 180.
In Poseck v. Veckroth, 3 D. Rep. 150, it
was held that a judgment recovered
against two defendants may be set-off by
the court against ajudgment obtained by
either of said defendants.
In this case one judgment was in tort
and the other on contract, and the court
(Archibald, J.) held that a set-off was
proper.
In Riehl v. Veckroth, 1 D. Rep. 80, it
was held that ajudgment without a waiver
of exemption can be set-off against one
with a waiver.
There is, however, a long line of decisions which support the doctrine that a
judgment in tort can be set-off against one
on contract. These cases all have been
decided by Judge Archibald, and have
been severely commented upon by later
judges.
The respondent contends that the rule
to show cause should be discharged for
the following reasons: 1st, The power to
set-off one judgment against another does
not rest upon statute, but upon general
jurisdiction of courts over their suitors.
2ud, The rights of the 'parties are not the
same, as exemption cannot be claimed upon
a judgment for tort.
In Pennsylvania we have an Act of Assembly which provides that property to
the value of $300 shall be exempt from levy
and sale on an execution issued upon any
judgment obtained upon contract. Act of
1849, P. & L., Vol. 1, col. 1920. This Act
provides for cases of contract only, and
specifically says that no exemption can be
claimed upon judgments for torts. 5 Phila.
531.
In Windle v. Moore, 10 W. N. C. 387,
Moore bought a horse and carriage from
Windle, intending to pay for them with a
note. Upon Moore's refusal to pay the
note, Windle brought an action of trover
against him and recovered judgment for
$33. Moore then brought suit against
Windle on the note, and having obtained
judgment thereon for $354, took this rule
in Windle's suit against him to allow the

judgment in trover to be set-off against
thejudgment on the note. The rule was
refused, and the court said, "this power
will never be exercised where the set-off
would deprive the party of his legal
rights."
In McClintock v. Alexander, 3 D. Rep.
149, Alexander made application to the
court to set-off a judgment in tort against
ajudglnent in assumpsit. The court held
that in assunpsit the defendant has a
right to claim the benefit of the exemption
law, and, therefore, the right of set-off
would not exist.
It is a well established rule that the law
favors the debtor's right to exemption,
and to allow a set-off in tort against a setoft on contract would be in direct contravention of the statute, and would bar the
respondent from his right to the $300 exemption, which the statute hasspecifically
provided for him.
Since one has a right to exemption and
the other has not, then the two judgments
are not of equal grade, and it would be improper to allow a set-off.
While each case depends upon its own
particular facts, it is a principle of sound
law that a man cannot be deprived of his
right to exemption, unless by his own act
or assent. In Higgins v. Dunkleberger, 9
D. Rep. 91, one judgment was founded
upon an action in trespass and the other
was upon a book account. The courtheld
that there could be no set-off, because the
judgments were not of equal grade, the
one having the right to the benefit of exemption laws and the other did not.
The Act of 1887, in regard to wages and
labor, is of same character as the Act of
1849, in regard to exemption; and in
Bocheove v. Maurer & Rothermel, 5 Pa.
C. C. 216, it was held that an ordinary
judgment can not be set-offagainst ajudgment for wages and labor, since the Act of
1887, prohibits allowance of exemption
from execution against manual labor.
The right to set-off onejudgment against
another is not a legal but an equitable
right, and will not be allowed where it
will infringe on another's right of equal
grade. Shoemaker v. F.ossell, 8 Pa. C. C.
479.
We are inclined to think thatthe case of
Poseck v. Veckroth, supra, although similar to this case, is not sound law, and,
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therefore, we decline to follow its rulings.
Whether or not Fell can claim a set-off
of $200 after Abbott has received benefit of
the $300 exemption, we need not now consider, as that point has not been pressed
in this case.
In view of the law, we are, therefore, of
the opinion that no set-off can be allowed
in this case. The rule to show cause is
discharged.
LONG, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

There is no appreciable reason for refusing the set-off sought by Fell. Abbott
had a judgment against him for $200, and
he had one against Abbott for $900. The
former judgment ascertained that Fell
should pay $200 to, and the latter, that he
should receive $900 from, Abbott. Why
then should not the larger judgment cancel the former?
How can it matter, that the $200 judgment was for a tort? It was nevertheless
a judgment for $200.
The payment of
$200 would satisfy it, and nothing else
would. Nothing but the payment of $900
would satisfy the other judgment. Why
compel Fell to pay $200, when he already
had a right to receive $900 from Abbott ?
Itdoes notappear that Abbottis insolvent,
or that if he claimed the $300 exemption,
Fell could collect nothing of the $900. It
cannot, then, be said that to allow the setoff is to deprive Abbott of the exemption.
It does not appear that the 5900 debt was
bought by Fell for the purpose of set-off.
On the contrary, the debt to Fell existed
before the assault.
There is a bare possibility that Fell,
having a debt of $900, and despairing of
obtaining payment of any, or of more than
a small, part of it, thought he would inflictthe assault and set off the debt against
the damages. If any evidence tended to
show that he in fact was induced to cornmit the assault by any such consideration,
it might be proper to deny the set-off.
There is no evidence of the sort.
We agree, therefore, with the authorities
mentioned in Leitz v. Frohman, 22 Superior, 1, and with the judgment in that
case.
The order of the Common Pleas is reversed, with procedendo.

JONES vs. MAHON.

Lateralsupport-Subjacentsupport-Rule
of percolating waters discussed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Plaintiffand defendant owned adjoining
tracts of farming land. Recently it was
discovered by the defendant that there
was a stratum of asphalt below his land
and operation was commenced for the removal of the same. By reason of the removal of the asphalt, which is a valuable
mineral, with a density somewhat greater
than water, the plaintiff's land sunk four
feet, damaging it greatly for farming purposes. It appears the asphalt extended
under plaintiff's land, and the dislodgment of that under defendant's land,
caused the same to flow from under plaintiff's tract, producing the damage. The
action is for the loss of this support.
WILCOX for plaintiff.
1. One may not. withdraw lateral support, no matter if done with greatest care,
if it causes the falling in of his neighbor's
land. Mautlys v. Coal & Iron Co., 201
Pa. 70; Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199;
Folly v. Wyeth, 2 Allen (Mass.) 131; McGettigan v. Potts, 149 Pa. 155.
2. The mere fact of the osseous condition of the asphalt does not excuse defendant under the rule regarding percolating waters. Cabot v. Kingman, 166 Mass.
403; Murray v. Pannace, 64 N. J. Eq. 147;
Jardeson v. Sutton, 68 L. J. Ch. 457 Am.
Dig. (1900) B, col. 41.
Yocum for defendant.
Plaintiff claims damages for failure of
surface support and seeks to prove the same
by showing evidence of failure of lateral
support. He can not recover where such disagreement between allegata and probata
exists. Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474.
There must have been a physical entering upon plaintiff's land and removing

the subjacent support for the plaintiff to
recover. Yough. River Co. v. Hopkins,
98 Pa 343; Catlin & Co. v. Chappel, 101
Pa. 348; Robertson v. Coal Co., 172 Pa. 566;
Noonan v. Pardee, supra.
Rule as to percolating waters should be
applied. Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 303;
Brown et. al. v. Illins, 25 Conn. 582; Clark
v. Conroe, 38 Vt. 179.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The plaintiff and defendant were owners
of adjoining farms. The defendant discovering a stratum of asphalt below his
land, commenced operations for the removal of the same. By reason of the re-

THE FORUM
moval of the asphalt, which is a valuable
mineral (with a density somewhat greater
than water), the plaintiff's land sunk four
feet, damaging it greatly for farming purposes. It appears that the asphalt extended under the plaintiff's land, and the
dislodgment of that under defendant's
land, caused the same to flow from under
plaintiff's tract, producing the damage of
which he complains and for which he
seeks compensation.
The learned counsel for the defendant
consumed much of his valuable time contending that the allegataand the probata
in the case did not correspond and asked
that the plaintiff be subjected to a compulsory non-suit. We dispose of this point
with the comment that we believe a more
careful perusal of Noonan v. Pardee, 200
Penna. 474, and of the facts of this case,
will, no doubt, discover an erroneous interpretation of the former as to its bearing on
the latter in the particular for which it
was cited.
The only question involved in the case,
we believe, is whether the owner of land,
who, in excavating its soil for a lawful
purpose and in a lawful manner, has
caused to settle the land of an adjoining
owner, is liable in damages for the injury
inflicted.
From a very early period the courts
have been besieged with disputes concerning the right of support to soil in its
natural state by the soil of adjacent or
subjacent lands. An exhaustive review
of the course of the decisions in England
may be had in the opinions of Baron Pollock in Dalton v. Angus, L. R. 6 App.
Cas. 740, and of Chief Justice Gray in Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199.
It is said that the defendant had a right
to make what advantage he could of his
own property. Had not the plaintiff the
same right? Having exercised his right
in a reasonable way (for farming purposes)
had the defendant any right to use his
property in a manner so as to injure him?
Suppose the plaintiff's land had sunk
twenty-five feet, rendering it worthless.
Shouldn't he be allowed some compensation? It is a principle common to both
the civil and common law, that the proprietor of land, unless restrained by covenant or custom, has the entire dominion,
not only of the soil, but of the space above

and below the surface, to any extent he
may choose to occupy it. But the law
has justly admitted a qualification to this
dominion. And while every person has
the right to the undisturbed possession of
his own land, he has not the right to the
unrestricted enjoyment of that possession.
Hence the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas. Thus no man having land
adjoining his neighbor's, which has been
built upon, shall erect a building in such
a manner as to interrupt the light or the
air, or expose it to injury from the weather,
etc. This is in the nature of a prescriptive
right. A right which he acquires by having first built upon his land. The right
of lateral support is not a right by prescription. It is regarded as incident to
the land itself; it is a right of property
necessarily and naturally attached to the
soil. Farrand v. Marshall, 19 Barb. 380;
Jones v. Wagner, 16 P. F. Smith 429. An
absolute right, limited, however, to the
soil in its natural state. Washburn on
Easements, 514; Weir's Appeal, 81J Penna.
203; Thurston v. Hancock, 12 Mass. 220.
And even though the pressure on the soil
has been increased by buildings erected
upon it, a person is liable for removing
the natural support from it, if the soil
would have sunk without the buildings.
Strogan v. Knowles, 4 H. & N. 180; Hammer v. Knowles, 6 Id. 454. So that we
reach the conclusion that the rule to be
observed where the rights of parties relate
to the soil in its natural state, is, that
neither shall excavate his own soil so as to
cause that of his neighbor's to sink or fall
away, and that for any impairment of this
rule a right of action will accrue to the
party injured.
It has been suggested that the law governing subterranean waters, in reference
to support, should be followed in this case.
While it is true that at common law an
owner of land has no right to the supply
of subterranean water, and no action lies
for the injury where the adjoining owner,
in improving his property, incidentally
drains his neighbor's land so as to cause
the land to sink and the buildings thereon
to be injured-Popple v. Hodkinson, L.
R. 4 Exch. 248; yet we have been able to
find but a single American case where an
attempt has been made to further extend
thisrule. In Cabotv. Kingman, 166 Mass
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403, decided in 1896, four dissenting judges
were inclined to make a distinction between the support of solids and the support of liquids. Here the plaintiff was
deprived of the lateral support to his land,
in consequence of which quicksand run
from under his land into a trench dug by
the defendants, causing the surface to settle and crack. The dissenting judges
argued that, by analogy, the right to support from quicksand which flows so freely
should follow the decision as to subterranean waterin Popple v. Hodkinson, supra.
Chief Justice Field, in allowing a recovery,
says : "We are unable to distinguish this
case from one where the soil falls in from
the surface in consequence of an excavation in the adjoining land."
Also in Jordeson v. Sutton, etc., 68 L. J.
(h. 457; American Digest (1900) B, col.
4, (English), decided in 1899. Here the
l)laintiff and defendant were owners of
adjoining lots, under which was a stratum
of running silt, and the land upon which
the plaintiff's house stood was supported
by this stratum of silt. The defendant, in
excavating upon his own property for the
purpose of his works, reached down and
cut through this stratum of silt, with the
result that the land tinder the plaintiff's
house subsided. There was a conflict of
evidence as to how far this running silt
was liquid rather than solid ; that is,
whether it was muddy water or wet sand.
Held : that the damage to the plaintiff's
house was caused by the withdrawal of
saud or soil in the shape of silt from under
his land, owing to the acts of the defendant on his own land, and in a lawful manner, and that what the defendant had
done was an actionable nuisance at common law.
Also in Trinidad Asphalt Co. v. Ambard, 68 L. J. P. C. 114, American Digest
(1900), col. 41, (English), decided in 1899,
it was held that the principle that no action will lie against a man who collects or
pumps up underground water percolating
the earth in no defined channel, though
the effect of such working may be to withdraw the water supply from a neighbor's
property, does not apply to pitch or any
other liquefying substance; and where
subsidence or other damage is caused by
the withdrawal of such support to adjacent
land, an injunction and damages will be
awarded.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that
the plaintiff, Jones, has a right of action
for the injury sustained, and further, that
the caseshould go to the jury for the ascertainment of the damages.
PAUL WILLIS, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

But little information is furnished by the
evidence concerning the nature of asphalt.
Its density is said to be somewhat greater
than that of water; a fact of no assistance
to us. It is further said that the dislodgment of the asphalt on Mahon's land
caused that under Jones' to "flow fron
under" it. A certain liquidity is therefore apparent. The New International
Encyclopaedia, Vol. II, p. 107, describes it
as "a bituminous substance of solid consistency." The largest natural deposit of
it, that on the island of Trinidad, as it is
stated, is "118 feet deep near the margin,
and 78 feet in the centre, and, although
solid in appearance, there is nevertheless
a continual but almost imperceptible motion throughout the mass." "Several
streams" of it have flowed down the slope
of the inclosing basin towards the shore.
" While the asphalt is solid enough to
drive a wagon and team across it, still the
slow movement of the material tends to
draw in the tracks laid out to the pits,
unless properly supported." The asphalt
is "dug by means of picks before daylight,
when [it is] brittle." The asphalt of the
Bermudez Lake is softer than that of
Trinidad, "so soft that the holds of the
transports must be divided into coinpartments to prevent flowing to one side, and
giving the ships a permanent list."
If by an excavation on his own land
Mfahon had caused the soil of Jones to fall
into it, so as to injure his surface, Mahon
would have been liable in damages. A
owes the duty to B, an adjoining laud
owner, of refraining unconditionally from
causing the falling in of B's land by the
withdrawal of the lateral support furnished by A's land in its natural state. A
is not permitted to withdraw this support
even if he acts with the utmost care, if the
effect is the falling in of B's land. Matulys v. Coal and Iron Co., 201 Pa. 70;
Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 199 ; M eGettigan v. Potts, 149 Pa. 155; Forley v.
Wyeth, 2 Allen 131.
When an excavation is made in A's
land, B's adjacent land, if any of it falls
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into the excavation, falls thereinto by the
force of its own gravitation ; or of that of
the superincumbent mass. If any portion
of it is seni-liquid, or viscous, it nmay more
easilyyield to thisgravitatiou and pressure
than if it is solid. We cannot see, however, how the degree of solidity can be
adopted as a criterion for determining
whether the excavating owner shall or
shall not be liable. The cases cited by the
learned court below are quite satisfactory
on this point. In Cabot v. Kingman, 166
Mass. 403, a liquid silt orsand in B's land
ran into tile excavation made by A in a
street, and A was liable. Cf. also, MLurray
v. Pannaci, 69 N. J. Eq. 147; 53 Atlan.
595; Jordeson v. Sutton, Am. Dig. (1900)
B, col. 41. In Trinidad Asphalt Co. v.
Ambard, Am. Dig. (1900) B, col. 41, the
substance which escaped into the excavation was pitch. In these cases either damages for the subsidence was allowed, or an
injunction to prevent the subsidence was
granted.
The attempt to apply the principle of
Popple v. Hodkinson, L. R. 4 Exch. 248,
viz: that if the escaping substance is
water, no damages for the subsidence
caused by the escape of the water will be
allowed, to the case of the escape of liquid
silt and sand, was resisted by the majority
of the court in Cabot v. Kingman, supra,
and the refusal to apply it to the case before us might be justified either by denying the soundness of the decision itself,
or by discovering in the difference of the
liquidity of water and the viscousness of
asphalt a reason for comparing the asphalt
to the ordinary materialsof the soil rather
than to water. The asphalt is sufficiently
solid to predicate of it the same ownership
as of the soil. It is sufficiently solid to
make the precau tions to prevent its lateral
escape substantially as simple as those
which prevent the lateral escape of the
soil. Neither because the ownership of
the asphalt can be doubted, nor because of
the impracticableness, by reasonable endeavor, of confining it, have we any reason
for refusing to hold it the duty of the excavator to confine it.
Judgment affirmed.
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WAREHAM vs. WILEY.
One claiming propertymutst recover upon
his own title not through want of title in
the defendant.- lVhat constitutes titleRights of finders.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The defendant hired of the plaintiff an
upright piano and after having it for some
time, discovered tucked back in a secret
recess of the piano, ten one-hundred dollar
bills. The money was not placed there
by the plaintiff but it is supposed was secreted by some former owner of the instrument, not known.
Plaintiff contends that money belongs
to him as he had possession of piano
before the defendant had and further did
not hire him anything but a piano. Defendant claims he is entitled to the money.
There are no other claimants.

Cooic for plaintiff.
Money or property laid away and forgotten is not in legal contemplation lost;
and such money belongs to parly owning
property, in which money was concealed,
as against all but the true owner. State
v. McCann, 19 MIo 249; Lawrence v. State,
1 Humph. 228; McAvoy v. Medina, 11
Allen (Mass.) 549.
FLEITZ for defendant.
Money found in position where owner
cannot be thought to have parted possession with it continues to be property of
original owner, if he claim the property;
if not it becomes the property of the
finder. Durfee v. Jones, 11 R. I. 581;
Hamacker v. Blanchard, 90 Pa. 377; Huthmacher v. Harris, Admrs., 38 Pa. 377.
OPINION OF 11IE COURT.

In thoroughly considering this case,
as we have endeavored to do, we have
been helped a great deal by Chief Justice
Holmes in his work entitled "The Common Law."
Among other things Mr.
Holmes says, "At common law, in order
to gain such possession as the law will
recognize, a man must stand in a certain
physical relation to the object and to the
rest of the world, and must have a certain
intent. In such a case the law excludes
others from interfering with the object,
and therefore it wouldseem that the intent
which the law should require is an intent
to exclude others. '
Therefore, according to Mr. Holmes' conception of the common law on this subject,
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(and we thoroughly concur with Mr.
Holmes) a man in order to exercise an intent to exclude others, must first know of
the object upon which this intent is to be
exercised.
In Bridges v. Hawkesworth, 7 Eng.
Law, Eq. Reps., the decision is based upon
this principle.
The plaintiff picked up from the floor of
the shop of defendant a parcel containing
bank notes, and handed them to the defendant to keep till the owner should
claim them. They were advertised in a
leading newspaper of the City of London,
but no owner appeared to claim them.
Ten years elapsed and the plaintiff requested defendant to return the parcel to
him, tendering the costs of the advertisements, and offering the indemnity.
The judgment of the Court was for the
plaintiffas finder. Foras has been said by
an eminent jurist in discussing this case,
the shop keeper not knowingof the thing,
could have no intent to appropriate it, and,
having invited the public to his shop, he
could have no intent to exclude them
from it.
There are a number of other English
decisions which seem to be based upon
this same principle.
The English cases however scrutinize
the character of the finder with a great
deal of severity. [n Merry v. Green, 7
Mee. and Wels. 623, a person purchased at
a public auction a bureau in which he afterwards discovered, in a secret drawer, a
purse containing sovereigns and bank
notes, which he appropriated to his own
use, neither he nor anyone else knowing
at the time of the sale that the bureau
contained anything whatever. It was
here held that if the buyer had no reason
to believe that anything more than the
bureau was sold, the abstraction of the
money was a felonious taking, and he was
guilty of larceny in appropriating the
money to his own use.
In Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Strange 504,
it was held that the finder of a chattel,
though he does not by such finding acquire an absolute property of ownership,
yet he has such property as will enable
him to keep it against all but the rightful
owner, and consequently may maintain
trover.
Coming to the more recent American

decisions of this subject, we find that
while they are not altogether in harmony,
the general trend is towards the English
version which we have just discussed.
In Matthews and wife v. Harsell, Mrs.
Matthews, a domestic in the house of Mrs.
Barmore, found some Texas notes, which
she handed to her mistress to keep for her.
Mrs. Barmore afterwards entrusted the
notes to Harsell for the purpose of ascertaining their value, informing him that
she was acting for her servant, for whom
she held the-notes. Harsell sold them,
and appropriated the proceeds; whereupon
Mrs. Matthews sued him and recovered
their value, and interest from date of sale.
In the course of his remarks in this case
Woodruff, J., says: "The Courtof Queen's
Bench in England has recently decided
that the place in which a lost article is
found does not form the ground of any exception to the general rule of law, that the
finder is entitled to it against all persons,
except the owner."
Such, of course, must be borne in mind,
and is always the case as to the true owner,
for no one has as good a title to the particular thing as the true owner; no one but
the true owner having what may be
termed a perfect title in law.
The only case which we have found exactly like the one at bar is Durfee v. Jones,
11 R. I. 588, in which a man bought a safe,
and then, wishing to sell it again, sent it
to defendant, and gave him leave to keep
his books in it until sold. The defendant
found some bank notes stuck in a crevice
of the safe, which, coming to plaintiff's
ears, he demanded the safeand the money.
The defendant sent back the safe, but refused to give up the money, and the court
sustained him in his refusal. We think
this is good law, based upon the old common law theory. In Taune v. Sharpless,
6 Phila. Rep. 18, the plaintiff was a conductor on a passenger car. The car upon
this particular occasion arrived at the end
of the route, and after all the passengers
had left the car there remained on one of
the seats a pocketbook, containing about
one hundred dollars. The plaintiff picked
up the pocketbook and turned it over to
the receiver of the company, who had been
appointed by the Supreme Court. The
receiver caused the pocketbook to be advertised, and one year having elapsed
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without anyone calling for it, or claiming
the property, the conductor demanded the
return of the pocketbook. The court, in
its opinion, among other things, said in
substance : "In the absence of any legislation on the subject, and in the absence of
any regulations of the company on the
subject, we have nothing to guide our
judgment but the known principles of
common law, which accord to the finder a
special property in such cases," and judgment was given for plaintiff.
In Hamacker v. Blanehard, 90 Pa. 377,
a domestic servant in a hotel found in the
public parlor a roll of bank bills. She immediately informed the proprietor of the
hotel, who suggested that the money belonged to a transient guest of the house,
and received it from the servant to hand
to the guest. It was afterwards ascertained that the guest did not lose the
money, and upon demand by the servant
the proprietor refused to return it to her.
She brouight assumpsit for the money, and
it was held that she was entitled to recover.
Upon the first blush the case of Huthmacher V. Harris' Administrators, 38 Pa.
491, seems to hold a contrary doctrine to
Hamacker v. Blanchard supra,but we find
upon a more careful reading of the case that
it is exactly in accord with the other Pennsylvania decisions cited, as well as the
common law theory. In this case a party
purchased at an administrator's sale "a
drill machine," which, unknown to all
parties, contained valuables in the shape of
promissory notes, bank notes, silver and
gold coin, and it was held that the sale
passed to the purchaser the right to the
machine, and every constituent part of it,
but not to the valuables contained in it,
which, on discovery, was to be held for the
personal representative of the deceased
owner.
It must be borne in mind, as has been
already said, that the finder in all of these
cases does not have a better or as good a
title as the real owner, but simply has a
right to possession as against every one
but the real owner. In this last mentioned
case the administrator was the real owner.
He was at law the owner. There is
no doubt as to who had put these valuables in the "machine," for the promissory notes were made out in favor of Elisha
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Harris, the administrator's intestate. The
valuables were the property of Harris, and
at his death by law became the property
of the administrators, who held the property for thebenefit of the estate. Of course
the finder, who happened to be the vendee
of the machine, did not acquire a good
title as against the real owner.
We do not think it is necessary to discuss this case at bar any further, as the
conclusion seems self-evident that Wiley
is entitled to the money found in the piano,
as against every one except the true owner.
Who the true owner is in this case does
not appear, but what does appear is that
Wareham, the plaintiff in the case, is not
the owner.
In deciding this case we have presumed
that Wiley made an honest endeavor to
find the rightful owner of the bills, as the
contrary does not appear.
Judgment is therefore given in favor of
defendant.
J. HOWARD JACOBS, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

We affirm the judgment of the lower
court. As far as we have been able to ascertain there is no authority in this State
directly in point upon the question involved. Durfee v. Jones, 11 R. I. 588,
however, is a case with the same facts approximately, and the decision there is in
accord with the court below. Two points
have been urged in favor of the claim of
plaintiff, first that be had prior possession
of the subject matter in question; second,
that it was found secreted in his chattel.
"To gain possession a man must stand in
a certain physical relation to the object
and the rest of the world and must have a
certain intent." Holmes' Common Law,
216. It is contended that the possession
of the secreted money was included in
that of the piano. According to Judge
Holmes the only intent necessary at common law is a general excluding intent,
that the intent of the possessor need not
be directed towards the specific object.
His reasoning would lead to the plaintiff's
success in the case at bar, supra, 225. The
argument, however, is far reaching and
leads to results not borne out by the decisions. Every property owner could claim
as against the finder lost articles upon or
in his property by virtue of the general
intent to exclude others from his own and

86

THE FORUM

all connected therewith. If then articles were lost upon the highways or
other public property, it might be advanced that the State is entitled upon a
like argument as bona vacantia. However desirable such results might be, they
do not at present, find affirmation in the
reports. Furthermore, one hesitates to
found a better right in present plaintiff
upon such fictitious possession. It is next
urged that aside from the technical argument concerning possession, there is some
peculiar virtue in the fact of the money
being found in plaintiff's chattel. We are
persuaded there is no weight in this contention. As far as we have been able to
glean from decided cases, the general rule
has been from the early case of Armory
v. Delamirie, 1 Stra. 505, that the finder of
an article which has in fact been lost is
entitled to it against all persons except the
real owner, and that the place where the
article is found makes no legal difference.
Bridges v. Hawkesworth, 15 Jur. 1079.
An article may be lost as truly by a voluntary parting with custody, followed by
misadventure preventing recovery, as by
an involuntary parting with possession.
In the case at hand the defendant was the
finder and under the general rule is entitled to hold against all but the true
owner. There is nothing in the contract
of bailment to preclude this.
Judgment affirmed.
WM. HARPER vs. THE RAILROAD.
Negligence-Extending portions of one's
body from the window of a passenger
coach negligenceper se-Power of court
to find negligence as a fact, and grant
-non-suit.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Harper was riding in a car of defendant's. His window was up, and his elbow
projected an inch beyond the outer side of
the car. It happened that on a baggage
platform, near the track, an employee of
the road had allowed a truck with some
trunks on it to stand, so that in passing it
the elbow of plaintiff struck a trunk,
whereby plaintiff was seriously injured.
Trespass for the injury, $1,000 being
claimed as damages.

TYLER for plaintiff.
The injury complained of having resulted from the improper and unsafe conduct of defendant company in the business of transportation, the burden is on
such defendant company to disprove negligence. Thomas, Appellant, v. Phila. &
Reading R. R. Co., 148 Pa. 183.
Defendant company owed to plaintiff
the duty to give him timely notice of the
danger incurred in allowing his elbow to
project beyond the car, and a printed notice to that effect would not be sufficient.
Laning v. Colder et al., 8 Pa. 479; N. J. R.
R. Co. v. Kennard, 21 Pa. 203.
The injury resulting directly from the
negligence of defendant company's employee, the plaintiff may recover if the
jury find that hisarm was not so extended
as to endanger it in passing this platform
under ordinary circumstances. Curtis v.
The Central Railway, Vol. 10, Am. Neg.
Cases 684.
Even if, under the rule in Pennsylvania,
the plaintiff was negligent, still, as his
act in putting his elbow out of the window
was merely a condition, and not the proximate cause Qf injury, he may recover.
(Citing Davies v. Mann, 10 Mand W. 546,
Vol. 2, Ames' Cases on Torts, p. 151).
Thirteenth and Fifteenth Street Passenger
Railway v. Boudrou, 92 Pa. 475; Grand
Trunk R. A. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 429.

MCNEAL for defendant.
If the negligenceof plaintiff contributed
in any degree, he cannot recover. Monongahela City v. Fischer, 11 Pa. 13.
The want of ordinary care and prudence
on the partof the person injured is deemed
contributory negligence. Graham v. Pa.
R. R. Co., 139 Pa. 149; Mattamore v. City
of Erie, 144 Pa. 14.
Plaintiff could have foreseen the injury
resulting from exposinghis arm outof the
window by the exercise of ordinary circumspection, and by his failure to do this
he has violated the rule of law in regard
to ordinary care. Marion Robertson v.
The Pa. R R. Co., 180 Pa. 43; Beynon v.
Pa. R. R. Co., 168 Pa. 642; Oil City Fuel
Supply Co. v. Boundy, 122 Pa. 449.
Plaintiff having his arm through and
out of the window an inch at the time of
the accident, was negligentper se, and it
is the duty of the court to direct a nonsuit. Pittsburg and Connellsville R. R.
Co. v. McClung, 56 Pa. 294: Catawissa R.
R. Co. v. Armstrong, 49 Pa. 186 ; Todd v.
The Old Colony R. R. Co., 3 Allen 18 ;
Sullivan v. Reading R. R. Co., 6 Casey
234; Lucas v. N. B. and T. R. R. Co., 6
Gray 64.
It is the duty of the court in case of clear
negligence arising from an obvious disregard of duty and safety to determine it as
a question of law. Catawissa R. R. Co. v.
Armstrong, 2 P. F. Smith 282; Pa. R. R.
Co. v. Ogler, 11 Casey 71.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

posure of the body or limbs to outward

The plaintiff, from the history of the
case, was injured while a passenger in the
cars of the defendant company by reason
of the protrusion of his elbow beyond the
sill of the car window next to which he
sat during the journey, and its coming in
contact with some trunks lying on a truck.
Did the plaintiffs negligence in allowing
his elbow to project an inch beyond the
outer side of the car contribute in any degree to the injury complained of? It if
did, there can be no recovery.
We must assume that the plaintiff was
a man of ordinary intelligence, afflicted
with no ailment or epileptic fits. This
being so, the carrier would not be required
to give him more care and attention than
an ordinary passenger. He would, therefore, be under an obligation to take care of
himself, and the projection of his elbow
beyond the window-sill was negligence
per se, which makes him guilty of contributory negligence, for which no recovery
can be had.
The defendant in this case, having undertaken to transport the plaintiff in its
cars, were bound to exercise.due and reasonable care in the performance of the duty
which it had assumed. Ontheotherhand,
when a passenger on a railroad purchases
a ticket it entitles him to a seat in the car.
In the seat no part of his body is exposed
to obstacles outside of the car. The duty
of the latter arises on entering, that he will
conform to all the reasonable regulations
and rules of the company for occupying,
using and leaving the cars, and if be does
not so conform, but is guilty of negligence
therein, and is injured, although there may
be negligence on the part of the carrier, its
servants or agents, he cannot recover.
Sullivan v. Reading R. R. Co., 30 Pa. 234;
Pa. R. R. Co. v. Zebe et ux., 33 Pa. 318.
If the plaintiff was riding in the car with
his elbow or arm projecting out of the windowyby reason of which he sustained an
injury, he wasguiltyof a want of duecare,
which will prevent him from maintaining
thisaction. Looking at the mode in which
railroads are constructed, with posts and
barriers placed very near the track on
which the cars are to pass, the rapid rate
at which trains move, and the manner in
which cars are made, with seats to accommodate passengers so as to avoid any ex-

objects in passing, we can see no ground
on which it can be contended that a person traveling on a railroad is exercising
reasonable care in placing his elbowin such
a position that it protrudes from a window
and may come in contact with external
obstructions.
It has been held by the Supreme Court
of this State that it is a want of due care
to attempt to leave a car when the train is
in motion, although going at a slow rate
of speed. It is no less a want of proper
care to ride in a car with an arm or leg exposed to collision against passing trains.
People are not to be treated as cattle; they
are to be presumed to act reasonably in all
given contingencies, and the company had
no reason to believe or expect anything
else in this case.
The counsel for plaintiff cite N. J. R. R.
Co. v. Kennard, 21 Pa. 203, and Laning v.
Colder, 8 Pa. 479. Both these cases have
been overruled in Pittsburg and Connellsyille R. B?. Co. v. AlcClurg, 56 Pa. 294, in
which the facts are identical with the case
at bar. The counsel for plaintiff also lay
great stress upon the principle of Davis v.
Mann, 10 M. & W. 546, which we think
has no relevancy to the case under consideration.
We think the principle in the case of the
Pittsburg and Connellsville R. R. Co. v.
McClurg, above cited, governs, and consequently a non-suit is entered.
KAUFMAN, MORGAN S., J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
The learned court below has non-suited
the plaintiff, holding that (1) the plaintiff's act was negligent, and (2) that it
could be declared so by the court. There
are cases in which, though negligence is a
fact, it can be found by the court without
submitting it to a jury. R. R. v. McClurg,
56 Pa. 294; Delaware, etc., R. R. v. Cadow, 120 Pa. 559. That the court did not
err in holding that it was negligent for the
plaintiff to allow his elbow to so far project beyond the side of the car as to come
in collision with objects upon the platform,
is clear from the cases cited by it.
Judgment affirmed.
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PATTERSON vs. SMITH.
Bankraoptcy Act 1898-Insolvency Act of
1901 superseded-Discharge under Act
1901 ineffectual.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Defendant last June a year made assignment for benefit of creditors under Act of
1901.
Plaintiff, to whom defendant owed a
debt contracted in February of the same
year, came in with the rest of creditors,
filed his claim and received on final distribution fifty cents on the dollar.
The assigned estate has been closed,
all funds distributed, and defendant discharged.
After this, in September last, defendant's uncle died leaving him, by will, a
legacy of $I,000 which was paid to him before final action.
Plaintiff now sues for the balance of his
claim as presented to assigned estate.
Defendant sets up his discharge under
the Act of 1901.
Plaintiff replies that this Act has been
superseded by the Federal Bankruptcy
laws.
Judgment for defendant. Appeal.
AmERmiAN for plaintiff.
A State may pass a bankrupt law only
when Congress has not established a
uniform system of bankruptcy conflicting
with such law. Ogden v. Saunders, 12
Wheat. 213; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223;
ex parte Eames, 2 Story 322; F. & M.
Bank v. Smith, 3 S. & R. 63.
Act of June 4, 1901, is in spirit and in effect a bankruptcy act encroaching upon
Federal Act of 1898, hence State Act is
superseded. Rees v. Boggs, 26 Co. Court
284; McMullen's Petition, 26 Co. Court 157;
In re Petition of Scheively, et. al., 26 Co.
Court 34.
FLEITZ for defendant.
A State may pass insolvent laws provided they do not conflict with federal
bankrupt laws. Sturges v. Crownshield,
18 U. S. 26.
PenusylvaniaAct of 1901 does not infringe
upon the Federal Act of 1898. Estate of
John Hull, 25 Co. Ct. 356.
A voluntary assignment seeks simply to
secure a pro rata distribution among credi
tors and is not contrary in principle to the
Federal Bankruptcy Act. Beck v. Parker,
65 Pa. 264; Barber v. Rogers, 71 Pa. 362.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The question raised and submitted to

this court for its determination is whether
our State Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 404,
relating to insolvency, is suspended in its
operation, by reason of the fact that the
United States Bankruptcy Law of 1898,
is in operation. It appears, upon investigation, that the decided weight of
authority is to the effect that State Laws,
partaking of the nature of Bankruptcy
enactments, are suspended, so long as a
Federal Bankruptcy statute is in force.
The law upon this subject seems to be
fairly stated in the American and
English Ency., Vol. XVI, page 642.
Heading.-State Laws suspended by enactment of Federal Laws, thus: "The
enactment of a bankruptcy law by
Congress suspends the operation of all
State Laws on the same subject from the
time it takes effect, as far as cases within
the purview of the Federal statutes are concerned, and subject to such limitations as
may be prescribed."
12 Wheaton U. S.
213; 117 Wheaton U. S. 201; 4 Wheaton U.
S. 122; 71 Pa. St. 362.
In the case of Tobin v. Trump, 7 Phila.
Rep. 123, it ,vas said by Thayer, Judge,
that a State may legislate upon a subject,
which is within the purview of the powers
given to Congress by the Constitution,
and in regard to which, legislation by the
States is not expressly prohibited, so long
as Congress does not itself exercise the
power delegated to it, yet when that
power has been exercised and the State
legislation has become incompatible with
it, the latter must become inoperative and
void. This results not only from the necessity of preserving harmony of action between the general government and the
states, but is the immediate consequence of the sixth article of the constitution which declares that "The
Constitution and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law
of the land, and the judges in every
state shall be bound thereby, anything in
the Constitution, or laws of any state to
the contrary notwithstanding." Whenever, therefore, an act of Congress, passed
in pursuance of the powers delegated to it,
by the Constitution, comes into collision
with an act of a state legislature, the latter
must give way. And so the question was
decided in exparte Lucius Eames, 2 Story
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laws of the state, were, ipso facto, susRep. 322, cited by plaintiff's counsel. It
pended. Assoon as defendantwas adjudged
was there held, that the bankruptcy law
a bankrupt, the laws of the United States
of 1841, upon going into operation in Febbeing paramount in authority, of course,
ruary 1842, ipso facto, suspended all action
upon future cases arising under the state supersede those of the state.
From the principles laid down in the
insolvent laws, where the insolvent perforegoing cases itseems to be the universal
sons were within the purview of the banklaw in the holding of all the courts in the
ruptcy law. In delivering the opinion
different states wherein an insolvent law
Judge Story sid: "It appears to me that
has been passed.
both systems cannot be in operation or
Therefore, we are clearly of the opinion
apply at the same time to the same perthat the United States Bankruptcy Law
sons, and where the state and the national
legislature, upon the same subject and the of July 1, 1898, supersedes the State Insame persons come in conflict, the national solvency Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 404,
notwithstanding the postponement of the
law must prevail, and suspend the operaright to commence proceedings under it.
tion of the state laws. This, as far as I
Judgment for the defendant is reversed.
know, has been the uniform doctrine
GAYLORD R. WILCOX, J.
maintained in all the courts of the United
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
States," and after referring to the different
We concur in the judgment of the court
opinions expressed by the judges in the
below. Irrespective of any statutory procaseofSturgis v. Crowinshield, 5 Wheaton
vision, there is noreason todoubt the jurisU. S. 122, as to the question of exclusive
diction at common law of a State court to
power, vested in Congress, by the Constidistribute an assigned estate among those
tution of the United States, to pass a
entitled thereto. Brightly's Ed., T. & H.
bankruptcy law, he says: "But all the
Pr., p. 14, et seq. The grave question,
courts were agreed that when Congress
however, is as to the vitality of our recent
did pass a bankruptcy act, it was supreme,
act of 1901. If its provisions are not in
and that the State Laws must yield to it,
force, the defense set up falls, and the parand could no longer operate upon persons
ticipation of the plaintiff in the distribuor cases within the purview of such act."
tion is but a satisfaction pro tanto of his
The counsel for the defendant bases his
claim. It is with hesitancy and much
argument and relies upon the decision
trepidation we venture any remarks upon
in 25 County Court Report 353, Estate
of John S. Hull, wherein the court ar- the act in question, especially in view of
the legal fusillade extant upon the subject
rived at an opinion very much in conflict
in recent volumes of the County Court
with the great weight of authority, tilReports, and the absolute dearth of any
though it virtually concedes the superior
direct appellate authority, either State or
jurisdiction of the National Bankruptcy
National, as to the exact time when a
Act of 1898.
State insolvent law in conflict with FedIn the case of Barber v. Rogers, 71 Pa.
eral legislation is superseded. There is
St. 362, where the defendant, Barber, was
perfect unanimity of opinion that Federal
arrested under the Act of July 14, 1842,
jurisdiction, when exercised, is superior to
and gave bond to apply to be discharged
that of State jurisdiction upon the subject
as an insolvent, he appeared and the hearof bankruptcies, but whether the National
ing was continued from time to time.
Act ipso facto supersedes State legislation,
While the case was pending, he was ador whether the latter is virile, giving the
judged a bankrupt in the United States
State courts jurisdiction until ousted by
Courts under the National Bankruptcy
procedure in the Federal courts, forms the
Act of 1867. The defendant requested the
dividing question in the inferior courts of
Court to charge: 1. That the Act of
thisState. The majority have followed the
Congress of 1867, suspended the insolvent
courts of other States in holding the preslaws of the State of Pennsylvania, from
ent act to be ipsofactosuperseded. In Esthe date of its passage.
It was held by Justice Sharswood on
tate of Hull, 25 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 354,
is given expression to the contrary
appeal, that from the time the bankrupt
view, calling the Federal the "paramount"
act of 1867, went into effect, the insolvent
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jurisdiction, superior only, however, to
that of the State courts when actually
brought into operation. It is a matter of
sincere regret the distinguished jurist did
not enter more largely into an expression of
views which so conflict with the expression
of courts of sister States; Harbaugh v. Costello, 184 Ill. 110; Parmenter Mfg. Co. v.
Hamilton, 172 Mass. 178, as well as numerous dicta of the Supreme Court of the
United States; 8turges v. Crowinshield, 4
Wheat. 122; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat.
213; Boise v. King, 108 U. S. 379. It is
admitted our act is essentially a bankrupt
law, not differing materially from the
Federal law. It must be taken as an entirety, furnishing a complete scheme or
system; if, therefore, superseded, it is as
a whole. State laws which are properly
bankruptcy acts are to be distinguished
from isolated statutes not forming part of
any regular system of bankruptcy, although having to some extent similar objects. Lowell, Bank., see. 9; Scully v.
Kirkpatrick, 79 Pa. 324. The evident purpose of the framers of the Federal Constitution was to produce actual uniformity,
and remove the confusion resulting from
conflicting State codes of insolvency. The
practical effect of the reasoning in Estate of
Hull is to produce that confusion and contrariety which it was sought to avoid. In
verity, according to this view, there is no
supersedure whatever, and a State court
may be invested with jurisdiction or no by
consent of the parties. The latter in fact
determines the force of a law. It is submitted the majority view is more in consonance with the purposeof national legislation. See also sec. 70, National Act, last
clause. The question is ultimately one for
Federal decision, arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
it would appear wise for us to follow the
trend of Federal cases.
Judgment affirmed.

HART vs. HOOPER.
Recorery of costs in an action for 850
brought originally in Court of Common
Pleas-Classof actions over which Justice of the Peace has jurisdiction-Real
contract discussion-Act of 1901 on costs
in cases certified by Justice of the Peace
to Court of Common Pleas.

STATEMENT

OF THE CASE.

C. Hart and S. Hooper did on the 2nd
day of January, 1903, execute a written
agreement for the sale of a farm; a deed
and possession were to be delivered on the
1st day of April, 1903. C. Hart, on the 1st
day of April, 1903, paid the purchase
money in full, accepted the deed, and went
into possession. After going into possession he discovered that S. Hooper, sometime after entering into the agreement,
but before delivering possession, had removed from said farm some of the flooring
boards of the barn, the lightning rod attached to the house, 32 panels of fence,
said fence being a pest and rail fence attached to the soil, 15 boards from another
fence attached to the soil, a hog trough
fastened in hog pen (a building), and the
glass coverings from a tobacco bed. Plaintiff brings an action of assumpsit on the
agreement of sale for $50, damages and
costs, having filed his affidavit in the
Court of Common Pleas that he is advised
by counsel and therefore believes that the
action is not cognizable before a Justice of
the Peace.
HUBLER for plaintiff.
The vendor must convey the estate in
the same state and condition that it was
at the time of entering into the agreement
of sale, otherwise the purchaser may repudiate the contract and recover his deposit.
Addison, Contracts, p. 48.
Physical annexation to realty is not necessary to convert a chattel into a fixture.
Whether it be such depends much on the
business for which the premises are used.
If the article, whether fast or loose, be indispensable in carrying on the specific
business, it becomes a part of the realty.
Morris' Appeal, 88 Pa. 368; Christian v.
Dripps, 28 Pa. 271.
Justices of the peace have nojurisdiction
in actions on real contracts where the title
to land may come in question. Lee v.
Deane, 3 Rawle325; Sechristv. Connellee,
3 P. & W. 388.
LANARD

for defendant.

The agreement of sale is without consideration, and therefore invalid. Am. &
Eng. Encyc. of Law, Vol. 6, p. 67.3.
A deed only passes the estate the vendor
has-Cressmell v. Grumbling, 15 W. N.
C. 93, such deed taking effect at time of
delivery. Cover, et ux, v. Manaway, 115
Pa. 238.
Assuming agreement valid, 1. plaintiff
must prove specific things taken to be part
of the realty ; 2. before a recovery forcosts,
must prove that the title of land is or may
come in question.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

The defendant has argued at some length
that the written agreement is void for want
of consideration, a contention that we cannot sustain.
This was in the nature of a bi-lateral
contract, that is, where the consideration
for a promise is a promise. It a person
promises to sell such goods as another
might buy, or to sell land if another shall
choose to buy, and before his offer is withdrawn the other orders goods or agrees to
buy the land or goods, the promisor is
bound to sell at the price named. He cannot then refuse to sell on the ground that
the promisee was not bound to buy. It is
equally well established that the vendor
must be prepared to transfer the estate in
the same state and condition that it: wa
in at the time of the making of the agreement of sale.
This the defendant did not do, but removed the following articles, to wit: Flooring boards of barn, lightning rod attached
to house, 32 panels of a post and rail fence
attached to the soil, 15 boards from another
fence attached to the soil, a hog trough
fastened in the hog pen, and the glass covering from a tobacco bed. "Whatever
belongs to the thing granted as part or
parcel thereof will pass with it though it
is notspecifically referred to. Thus, houses,
window-blinds, doors, and whatever constitutes a part of the realty, will pass with
a grant of land unless expressly reserved."
Tiedeman ou Real Property. So has the
rolling stock of a railroad been considered as part of the realty, and to pass with
a conveyance of the road without any special description of the same. It matters
not how these things were fastened to the
realty, the question is, were they a necessary part of the machinery for carrying on
the business? Christian v. Dreppe, 28 Pa.
271.
Though the property sold was composed
of various parts, yet if these parts were
united in their operations and were intended to be used and were actually used
in effecting one general purpose, whatever
was necessary to the business were flxtures
and would pass with the realty. Morris
Appeal, 88 Pa. 368. We think everything
removed by the defendant would come
within this rule, as the flooring and lightning rods were apart of the house, and the
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fences, glass and hog trough were necessary to carry on the business of the farm,
as evidently tobacco was one of the products of the farm, and the glass covering
was necessary to the culture of tobacco.
This brings us to the question of whether
or not the plaintiff can recover the costs in
this action.
The action is brought for $50 damages,
and is accompanied with an affidavit that
the plaintiff is advised and believes that it
is not cognizable by the Justice of the
Peace. The Act of 1810 provides that if
any action is brought in the Common
Pleas, that the Justice of the Peace has
jurisdiction of, and the plaintiff has not
caused an oath or affirmation to be made
that he believes the debt to exceed $100,
he cannot recover the costs in such action.
The Act of 1814 excepts from the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace,
"actions on real contracts for sale and
conveyance of land," and when the defendant makes affidavit that the title of
land will come into question the Justice
may no longer entertain it. The supplementary Act of 1879 gives concurrent
jurisdiction with the Common Pleas in
certain actions where the demand does
not exceed $300, and has a provision that
excepts "cases of real contract where the
title to land may come into question."
This provision does not apply merely to
cases where the title does come into question but where it may be disputed.
Dicta in Hilfenstein v. Heintz, 15 Pa.
360, expresses this point clearly, "In all
cases where the title to land may come
into question, directly, collaterally, or incidently as part of the contract sued upon,
a Justice of the Peace has no jurisdiction."
"The Legislature has not said that the
excepted cases must be on the contract, it
is sufficient to exclude it from the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace, that it
arises from it." Campbell v. Gallagher,
2 Pa. 135.
The doctrine of these cases clearly is that
the Justice shall not have jurisdiction
where the title to real property is either
directly or indirectly involved.
The case at. bar is brought on this real
contract and the Act of 1814 says, "Nothing in this Act shall be construedto extend
to actions on real contracts for the sale or
conveyance of lands or tenements." "A
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Justice of the Peace has nothing to do
with that species of property." Lee v.
Dean, 3 Rawle 325.
We think that this action would not be
cognizable before the Justice of the Peace,
because some of the things, the title of
which is in question, can properly be included under the term "land," and again
the action is on a real contract which is
excluded from the jurisdiction of the
Justice of the Peace.
We do not think that the supplementary
Act of 1901 will affect the right of the
plaintiff to recover costs in this action.
This act provides that where defendant
shall make affidavit that the title of lands
will come into question, the Justice shall
not receive the same until the defendant
shall enterin recognizance for an approved
sum to pay plaintiff such sum as may
be recovered against him, and upon such
oath being made and security given the
Justice of the Peace shall certify the suit
to the Common Pleas where it shall be
proceeded with as if originally brought
there, and in such cases the costs shall be
paid in equal shares by plaintiff and defendant.
This provides that the costs shall be
divided only where the suit was originally
brought before the Justice of the Peace,
and has been removed to the Common
Pleas by complying with the provisions of
the Act.
In this case the suit was brought originally in the Common Pleas, and as the
Justice of the Peace had no jurisdiction of
it, it was properly brought there.
Judgment for plaintiff for $50 and costs
of suit.
F. P. BENjAmIN, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The Act of 20th March, 1810, 1 P. & L.
2546, confers on justices of the peace a certain civil jurisdiction. It does not withdraw that jurisdiction from the courts of
common pleas, but in order to induce litigants to resort to the justice rather than to
the common pleas, enacts that a plaintiff
who begins proceedings in the latter when
he might begin them before the former,
shall forfeit his costs. This forfeiture depends on (a) the character of the action,
which must be within the justice's jurisdiction ; and (b) the amount of money involved. The record in the common pleas
will disclose the character of action. If, the

action beingone cognizable by ajustice, the
amount recovered is within the amount
which defines the justice'sjurisdiction, the
plaintiff will be entitled to no costs, unless
he shall, before obtaining the summons
from the court, have made affidavit that
he truly believed himself entitled to more
than $100. No such affidavit was filed in
the present case. The amount sought was
only $50. Whether the plaintiff is entitled
to costs depends, therefore, on the inclusion of the cause of action within a class of
actions over which thejustice has jurisdiction.
Theaction is based on a contract. Hooper
agreed to convey a farm to Hart, who paid
the money, and obtained a deed. He alleges, however, that certain components of
the land, of the nature of irremovable fixtures, were separated from it, and, therefore, that Hooper did not convey all that
he agreed to convey; or that he conveyed
what he agreed to convey in a condition
inferior to that in which he agreed to convey it. The floor, the lightning rods, the
fence, the hog trough, the glass covering
for the tobacco bed, were all evidently parts
of the premises; realty and not personalty.
But, whether they were or not, they were
alleged to be so by Hart, and the suit is
maintainable on no other hypothesis.
While justices have conferred on them
jurisdiction on cases "arising from contracts generally, provided that the amount
recoverable thereon does not exceed $300,"
an express exception is made of "cases of
real contract, where the title to lands or
tenements may come in question." Actions arising from contracts to convey land
arise from "real contracts," in the statutory sense. Campbell v. Gallagher, 2 W.
135 ; Lee v. Dean, 3 R. 325; Sechrist v.
Connellee, 3 P. & W. 388.
It is not necessary that the title to lands
shall come in question. It is enough that
it may come in question-Doud v. Truby,
2 Gr. 37; Sechrist v. Conuellee, 3 P. & W.
388; Goddard v. McKean, 6 W. 337; and
it indeed may in any case springing from
a contract of sale. Lee v. Dean, 3 R. 32-5.
But, in the present case, one of the questions actually involved is, whether the
floor, the lightning rod, etc., were a part
of the land or were merely removable fixtures. It would be idle to forbid ajustice's considering the title to land, and at
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the same time allow him to decide whether
certain things were or were not a part of
the land, the parties being at issue upon
this point.
The present action is for a breach of a
contract to convey land, but, whether
strictly so or not, it "arises" from such a
contract. Without the contract, Hart
could have no cause of action. Campbell
v. Gallagher, 2 W. 135.
It follows, as the learned court below has
ably shown, that the justice did not have
jurisdiction of the cause, and, therefore,
that the bringing of the suit in the common pleas, if anywhere, was unavoidable.
The affidavit is not required to entitle to
costs.
The Act of March 22, 1814, 1 P. & L.
2552, confers on justices jurisdiction over
actions of trover and conversion, and also
over trespass upon real as well as personal
property. Hart's action is not trespass for
injury to the land. The removal of the
floor, the fences, etc., took place before the
conveyance; and while it was, in a sense,
a violation of the equitable ownership of
Hart, which, by the contract, had come
into existence, Hart was not in possession,
nor had he a right to the possession, when
the removal was committed. But, even if
trespass would lie, and the present action
could be considered as an action of trespass, the jurisdiction of the common pleas,
being concurrent with that of justices over
such actions, may be invoked without
subjecting the plaintiff to the loss of costs.
The provisions of the 26th section of the
Act of 1810 do not extend to suits founded
on torts-Clark v. McKisson, 6 S. & R. 87;
Moyer v. Illig, 52 Pa. 444; Richards v.
Gage, 1 Ash. 192; Devers v. Geting, 3
Luz. Leg. R. 24, whether the plaintiff declares for more or less than $100 damages.
As the learned court below well says, the
Act of July 2, 1901, P. -L.608, has no application to the case before us. It directs
what shall be done whenever an action of
trespass shall be brought before a justice
of the peace. It provides for the supersedure of the justice's control of the case
by the affidavit of the defendant, and his
giving a recognizance. No action of any
sort has been brought by Hart before a
justice, nor has there been any affidavit or
recognizance by Hooper for the purpose of
superseding the justice's jurisdiction.
Judgment affirmed.
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COMMONWEALTH vs. JACKSON.
Proceedings under the Act of April 13,
1867-Bigamy-The Act of .farch 27,
1903, construed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Jackson was married to Jane Wheeler,
but learning 9 months afterward that she
had been married 11 years before, and that
the first husband was still alive, he deserted her and a year afterwards he married another woman. There are two proceedings: one a prosecution for bigamy,
the other a proceeding under the Act of
April 13, 1867, for an order for the support
of Jane Wheeler.
SETZER for the Commonwealth.
Cites the Act of March 27, 1903; Act of
April 13, 1867. Pierce v. Pierce, 12 L. R.
A. 359; Lea v. Lea, 90 Mass. 418; Ford v.
Ford, 143 Mass. 577.
MENGES for the defendant.

Jackson is not liable for the support of
Jane Wheeler under the Act of April 13,
1867.
He was never lawfully married to her
and therefore not being her lawful husband could not desert her. Heffner v.
Heffner, 23 Pa. 104; Klass v. Klass, 14 Pa.
Sup. 550; Thomas v. Thomas, 124 Pa. 646;
Com. v. Isaacs, 7 Kuip 304.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The first question before the court is:
"Whether or not the defendant committed
bigamy by contracting the second marriage before the first marriage had been
legally declared void by a decree of a
proper court of record;" and it is the
opinion of the court that under the Act of
1903, section 2, the defendant did commit
bigamy.
The language of the Act is clear and
reads as follows: "If any person who has
entered into a contract of marriage with
another person, whether the marriage be
valid in law or not, shall, while the other
contracting party be alive, and before said
former marriage has been legally declared
void and annulled by the decree of a
proper court of record, go through any
form of marriage recognized as binding
under the. law of this Commonwealth
with any other person, whether the parties thereto cohabit thereafter as man and
wife or not, he or she shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor."
Although the marriage of the defend-
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ant to Jane Wheeler was not a valid
marriage under the laws of this State,
nevertheless under the provisions of
the Act of 1903, it was necessary for
the defendant to have his former marriage annulled or legally declared void before he entered into the second marriage,
and having failed to comply with the requirements of the act it is the duty of the
court to instruct the jury to find the defendant guilty of bigamy.
The second proceeding is under the Act
of 1867, for au order for the support of
Jane Wheeler, and we do not think that
this proceeding can be maintained. The
Act of 1867 provides that if a husband deserts his wife without reasbnable cause he
shall be compelled to support her, and we
think the defendant was justified in refusing to live with the wife of another man,
and especially since she represented herself as being a single woman and thereby
deceived him.
We think the only purpose of the Act of
1903 is to prevent bigamous marriage and
nothing more. If the defendant was bound
to support Jane Wheeler we would have the
unusual sight of one lawfully married man
supporting not only his own lawful wife
but the lawful wife of another man, and
such we do not think to be the purpose of
the Act of 1903, therefore the court refuses
an order for the support of Jane Wheeler.
H. N. SIPES, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

When Jackson was "married" to Jane
Wheeler, she was already the wife of another. She had been married eleven years
before; the man to whom she was married,
was still alive, and, as we must assume,
there had been no divorce. As it is imipossible for a woman, already a wife, to
become the wife of another, the "marriage" to Jackson did not produce the relation of husband and wife, nor the rights
inhering in-husband and wife.
The defendant is indicted for bigamy.
"Bigamy is committed by a party who,
when already legally married to one person, marries another." 4 Am. & Eng.
Encyc. 35; 2 Wh. Crim. L. 488; Desty.
Am. Crim. Law, 224; Clark v. Marshall,
Crim. Law, 1103; Gise v. Commonwealth,
81 Pa. 428. There is no bigamy unless
there was a valid pribr marriage. Clark,
Crim. Law, 353. As Jackson's first "mar-

riage" was not legal, his second marriage
was not "bigamy."
The Act of March 27th, 1903, P. L. 102,
undertakes to punish a second marriage,
whether the first marriage was or was not
lawful, but it does not declare the second
marriage bigamous, unless the first marriage was valid. "In all such cases" [i.e.
of a second marriage,] says section 2 of the
act, "where the first marriage shall be
valid in law, the second and all subsequent marriages shall be bigamous and
void."
The second marriage, .though
criminal is neither bigamous nor void,
unless the first was valid. While, it is
true that in the 4th section, "bigamous
marriage" seems to be applied to all the
marriages forbidden by the act, we do not
regard this as a justification for holding,
in the teeth of the plain implication of
section 2, that a second marriage is to be
treated as bigamous, when the first was
void.
We think therefore that, on the count
charging "bigamy," there can properly
be no conviction, unless it is shown that
the former marriage was valid.
In the conclusion reached by the learned
court below with respect to the proceeding under the Act of April 13th, 1867, we
entirely agree with it.
Judgment reversed.
SARAH TOLLES vs. R. R. COMPANY.
Negligence-Judgmentof involuntarynonsuit is not a bar to a second action, still
less is a voluntary non-suit a bar-Evidence of such non-suit is not admissible
to decide the real merits of the case,
especially where it does not injure the
defendant-In accident to passenger,
negligence of carrieris presumed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Arriving at the station at which Mrs.
Tolles was to alight, the cars stopped and
she began to alight. While descending
the steps as expeditiously as possible the
car was suddenly moved by the engine;
the jar loosened Mrs. Tolles' hold on the
rail and she was thrown to the platform. The defendant was a New York
corporation, and one suit had been brought
against it in New York, but plaintiff had
suffered a voluntary non-suit. The court
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excluded evidence of this fact in the second suit-in Pennsylvania-for the same
cause. The court told the jury that the
jarring of the cars alone, were there no
confributory negligence, would make the
defendant liable, until it was explained
consistently with the highest degree of
care.
HENNEKE for plaintiff.
To suddenly put a train in motion without notice to dismounting passengers is
negligence per se. Williamson v. N. Y.
C. & H1. R. R. R. Co., 66 N. Y. 642. Nonsuit is not a barto a second action. Bournonville v. Goodsall, 10 Pa. 133.
RBARNHART for defendant.
Mere scintilla of negligence is not sufficient to take case to jury. Hummel v.
Phila. & Reading R. R. Co., 44 Pa. 375 ;
Wohan v. Pa. R. R. Co., 139Pa. 149. Burden of proof is on plaintiff to prove negligence. Phila. & Reading R. R. Co. v.
Boyer, 97Pa. 91. Negligence is never presumed, and is a question for the jury.
Zahnizer v. Pennsylvania Torpedo Co., 1U0
Pa, 350.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
This case comes before us on appeal, two
errors being assigned. First, that the
lower court erred in excluding evidence of
former proceedings in New York. Second,
that the charge to Lhe jury was erroneous.
The first error assigned is, that the court
excluded evidence of a voluntary non-suit
which the plaintiff suffered in an action
brought in New York for the same cause.
Evidence of this fact, the counsel for the
plaintiff in error claims, should have been
admitted in the second suit, which is subsequently brought in Pennsylvania.
While little emphasis is put on this point
in their argument, nevertheless we will
give it consideration here. The point is
not raised in the statement of facts where
the accident occurred, whether in Pennsylvania or New York, nor would it make
any difference if the accident did occur in
New York, the law of Pennsylvania would
still govern the case. However, we will
decide the case, assuming for a certainty
the accident occurred in Pennsylvania.
We fail to see the error in excluding this
evidence. It had nothing to do with the
merits of the case, if admitted. What
purpose could it serve? It could not even
be raised that it was a suspicious circumstance. The plaintiff had a right to bring
her action wherever she saw fit, provided
she acted in good faith. Our courts are
open to the people of other States. How,
then, could the lack of good faith be imputed to one who submits a claim to our
tribunals. This mere fact alone will not
raise an inference of bad faith. Raughley
v. R. R. Co., 202 Pa. 43; Smith v. Lathrop, 44 Pa. 326.
To admit such evidence would only con-
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fuse the jury, whose duty it is to decide on
the real merits of the case. A voluntary
non-suit does not affect the merits. Woodward, C. J., said: "An action in Virginia
was not a bar to an action in Pennsylvania
because it terminated in a non-suit; it was
not an adjudication of its merits, and a
non-suit would not barasubsequent action
anywhere, no matter with what liability
it is attended." Haws v. Tiernan, 53 Pa.
192; Bovelle v. Goodall, 10 Pa. 131.
It was held not to be error to exclude
evidence to the effect that plaintiff had
previously brought an action in New Jersey upon thesame cause of action, the case
still pending. Raugherty v. R. R. Co.,
supra.
The court below properly rejected the
evidence, and the first assignment is dismissed.
The second assignment presents a graver
point, in that it was error for the court
to charge that the jarring of the car
alone, were there no contributory negligence, would make the defendant liable,
until it was explained consistently with
the highest degree of care. The counsel
for the plaintiff in errof strongly argues
that the plaintiff must prove the negligeuce of the defe ndant company, and that
it is alonefor the jury to say whether such
negligence is sufficiently proven to allow a
recovery. Such, however, is not the law
in Pennsylvania in respect to this case.
The parties.stood in the relation as common carrier and passenger. That this relation does not terminate the instant the
train stops, but continues to exist during
a reasonable time for the passenger to
alight, is too obvious to give room for any
discussion. Leggett v. R. R. Co., 143
Pa. 39.
While this relation existed, Mrs. Tolles
wias injured while alighting from the defendant's train, there was no contributory
negligence on her part, she was not only
using ordinary care which she was bound
to use, but was alighting as carefully as
possible. Her acts, therefore, could not
have contributed to the accident. She
was entirely free from contributory negligence. The cause of the accident was the
sudden jar of the car by the engine. Just
what occurred about the engine to cause
the jar is not disclosed. These facts are
alone known to the defendant's servants.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff in
error claims, however, that the burden is
upon her to prove that this was caused by
some negligence of the company or its
servants. But the law in Pennsylvania
is well settled. Where a passenger is injured while the relation of carrier and
passenger exists without any fault of the
passenger, there is a legal presumption of
negligence on the part. of the carrier, and
casting upon them the onus of disproving
it. it is reasonable that it should be so,
because the company has in its possession,
and under its control almost exclusively
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Township v. Gordner, 109 Pa. 116; Haws
the means of knowing what occasioned
v. Tiernan, 53 Pa. 192; 6 Encyc. Pl. &
the injury, and of explaining how it ocPractice 987.
curred. While as a general rule the pasWe are not convinced that the exclusion
sdnger is destitute of all knowledge that
of the evidence of the New York non-suit
would enable him to present the parts and
could have done any harm to the defendfasten negligence on the company in case
ant. Alone it could not have legitimately
it really exists.
induced a different verdict. It is conceivThe legal presumption, which is only tn
able that the suffering of a non-suit would,
inference from the general experience, reunder circumstances, be an indication of a
mains of force until a countervailing
consciousness of the weakness of the plainpresumption of fact is established. But as
tiff's cause, and had itappeared that there
presumptions of law are always for the
had been present at the New York trial
court to pronounce, so are the repelling
witnesses for the defendant not present ft
circumstances relied on for the jury.
the trial below, in view of whose testimony
The plaintiff has proven her injury, also
the non-suit was suffered, etc., 'etc., the
that it was not caused by any fault of her
plaintiff's want of confidence on the goodown, but that it was caused by circumness of her cause might have been a useful
stances directly attributed to defendant's
piece of evidence.
servants, or the company itself in its
The court below virtually told the jury
property. The law therefore raises prima
that the jarring of the car, resulting in the
facie a presumption of negligence, and
hurt, made the defendant liable. This
throws the burden upon the company of
might mean that, independently of the
showing it did not exist. Sullivan v. R.
exercise of care, the defendant would be
R. Co., 30 Pa. 234; Del. & Lack. R. R. v.
liable; or it might mean that the jarring
Napheys, 90 Pa. 141; Spear v. P. W. & B.
cast on the defendant the duty of explainR. Co.i 119 Pa. 61; Raughley v. R. R. Co.,
ing it, consistently with care. The latter,
202 Pa. 43.
indeed, was the meaning of the'court. It
This legal presumption, of force, until
impelled by countervailing evidence,
distinctly referred to the jury the question
whether the company had shown that the
whieh is for the jury to determine whether
jarring had occurred, despite the exercise
or not it is a reasonable deduction. Such
of the highest degree of care.
evidence must establish sufficiently how
That the care owed by a carrier to its
the injury occurred, and, they were acting
passengers may be expressed properly by
consistently with the highest degree of
the phrase "highest degree of care" is not
care. Pa. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 87 Pa. 395;
Spear v. P. W. & B. R. Co., supra; to be disputed. Though it is generally
true that a plaintiff alleging negligence
Raughley v. R. R. Co., ,supra.
must prove it, the proof is sometimes suffiIn this case there being no evidence on
the partof defendant company to rebut the ciently made provisionally when certain
acts are shown, such as the jarring of the
existing presumption of law, for the jury's
consideration, their liability at law re- car while passengers are dismounting.
mained in force, and it was not error to
They justify the inference that they were
give binding instructions for the plaintiff. caused by carelessness, until some other
account of them is shown to be correct.
The jury were left to determine whether
Raughley v. R. R. Co., 202 Pa. 43. "The
or not the jar occurred; this question of
rule of law is," says Williams, J., "that
fact was not taken from them. It was not
the mere happening of an injurious accidisputed, however, and the court could as
dent to a passenger, while in the hands of
a matter of law give binding instructions
the carrier, will raise prima facie a prefor the plaintiff.
sumption of negligence, and throw the
We are of the opinion that the law as
onus of showing that it did not exist on
laid down by the lower court is correct,
the carrier." Spear v. P. W. & B. R. Co.
and applicable to the case. The second
assignment is also dismissed, and the
119 Pa. 61; Thomas v. P. & R. R. R. Co.,
148 Pa. 183. There are cases which it
judgment for the plaintiff in the lower
might be difficult to harmonize with these,
court is affirmed.
e. g., Herstine v. Lehigh Valley R. R.,
JOHN W. JACOBS, J.
151 Pa. 244,"but the doctrine of these is, we
OPINION OF THE SUPRtEME COURT.
think, irrefragable.
A voluntary non-suit had been suffered
The inadequacy of the assistance furin a trial of the same cause in New Ybrk.
nished by counsel to the court below Was
What the New York law is as to the congross.
Gentlemen seem to have thought
clusiveness of a non-suit has not been made
that they owed no duty to investigate,
to appear. We must assume, therefore,
either to the court or to themselves. There
that it accords with that of Pennsylvania.
were two or three highly important prinIn this State a judgment of involuntary
ciples involved, of which they indicate no
non-suit Is not a bar to a second action.
appreciation.
Such remissness is highly
Bournonville v. Goodall, 10 Pa. 133; Fitzcensurable.
patrick v. Riley, 163 Pa. 65. Still less
Judgment affirmed.
would a voluntary non-suit be a bar. Cf.

